



Republika e Kosovës  
Republika Kosovo - Republic of Kosovo



Autoriteti i Aviacionit Civil i Kosovës  
Autoritet Civilnog Vazduhoplovstva Kosova  
Civil Aviation Authority of Kosovo

# Occurrence Reporting Overview 2025



## Introduction

The Occurrence Reporting System aims to improve aviation safety by ensuring that relevant safety information relating to civil aviation is reported, collected, stored, protected, exchanged, disseminated and analysed. The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to attribute blame or liability. The information collected is adequately protected from unauthorised use or disclosure, and it is used strictly for the purpose of maintaining and improving aviation safety.

Occurrence reporting in Kosovo is governed by CAA Regulation No. 09/2017 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, of 6 September 2017, which transposes into the internal legal order of the Republic of Kosovo Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation. CAA Regulation No. 09/2017 has repealed CAA Regulation 1/2009 on occurrence reporting in civil aviation, CAA Regulation No. 08/2010 laying down implementing rules for the integration into a central repository of information on civil aviation occurrences exchanged in accordance with Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, and CAA Regulation 9/2010 laying down implementing rules for the dissemination to interested parties of information on civil aviation occurrences referred to in Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Whereas, CAA Regulation No. 11/2017 laying down a list classifying occurrences in civil aviation to be mandatorily reported according to CAA Regulation No. 09/2017, which transposes into the internal legal order of the Republic of Kosovo Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 of 29 June 2015 laying down a list classifying occurrences in civil aviation to be mandatorily reported according to Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, sets out the list classifying occurrences to be referred to when reporting, under mandatory reporting systems, occurrences which may represent a significant risk to aviation safety and which fall within the categories of Article 4 (1.) of CAA Regulation No. 09/2017 and the occurrences applicable to aircraft other than complex motor-powered aircraft.

All the aviation occurrences referred to in Article 4 (1.) of CAA Regulation No. 09/2017 and in Annexes I to V to CAA Regulation No. 11/2017 shall be reported to the Civil Aviation Authority of the Republic of Kosovo (the CAA) by the natural persons listed in Article 4 (4.) of CAA Regulation No. 09/2017. This reporting contributes to the improvement of the safety of civil aviation through better understanding of these occurrences to facilitate analysis and trend monitoring so that appropriate and timely preventive action can be taken and aviation safety improved.

The CAA has published on its website (<https://caa.rks-gov.net>) the link to *EASA Easy Access Rules* on Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 and its practical implementation. This document has the content: of the cover regulation (recitals and articles) and the implementing rule (IR) or delegated rule (DR) appear first, then the IR and/or DR annex points, followed by the guidance material (GM). The publication aims to explain the intended purpose of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 provisions and its implementing regulations, and where relevant, possible means of compliance and examples of good practice, to contribute to a consistent implementation of Regulation 376/2014 and its implementing rules across the EU, which is also being used to contribute to a consistent implementation of CAA Regulation No. 09/2017 and its implementing rules in Kosovo.

The Occurrence Reporting System has been established in Kosovo in 2006. By strict application of rules on confidentiality, protecting the source of safety information and ensuring the confidence of

staff working in occurrence reporting systems of civil aviation, the CAA has developed a relationship of trust with the reporters, and subsequently contributed to the improvement of the quality of occurrence reports. Furthermore, the operators have their own Safety Management Systems (SMS), which have advanced significantly in the recent years. The SMS usually integrates a component for treating and addressing reported occurrences, enabling the industry to contribute directly to the collection and analysis of safety-related occurrences.

The CAA is looking forward, in agreement with the European Commission, to update the European Central Repository (EU ECCAIRS Central Database) by transferring to it all information relating to safety stored in the CAA National Database as prescribed in Article 8 (2.) of Regulation No. 09/2017.

The CAA participates in an exchange of information by making all information relating to safety stored in its database available to the competent authorities of other ECAA Partners, EASA and the Commission, in accordance with Article 9 (1.) of CAA Regulation No. 09/2017. Also, in accordance with Article 9 (3.) of CAA Regulation No. 09/2017, the CAA forwards all pertinent safety-related information to the relevant authority of the ECAA Partner or EASA as soon as possible if it identifies safety matters which it considers either to be of interest to other ECAA Partners or EASA, or to possibly require safety action to be taken by other ECAA Partners or EASA.

This Occurrence Reporting Overview contains a description of the occurrence classes and categories, an analysis of the 2025 occurrence reports data and statistics, detailed information on the coded categories of the occurrences reported in 2025, lists with headlines and determined classes of all the occurrences, and a brief description of the most significant occurrences reported in 2025.

## Occurrence Classes

The CAA uses the ADREP (Accident/Incident Data Reporting) occurrence class taxonomy to classify occurrences by severity i.e. in terms of safety risk. The ADREP 2000 occurrence class taxonomy is a set of terms used by ICAO and it is part of the ICAO ADREP System.

The ADREP occurrence class taxonomy enables the identification of any rapid action needed when looking at high-risk individual safety occurrences and also enables key risk areas to be identified from aggregated information. This taxonomy helps the relevant entities, and in this case the CAA, in their assessment of occurrences and in determining where best to focus their efforts. It facilitates an integrated and harmonised approach to risk management and thus enables the relevant entities, including the CAA, to focus on safety improvement efforts in a harmonised manner.

The risk is determined based on the Regulation (EU) 2020/2034 that sets out the common European risk classification scheme (ERCS) for the determination of the safety risk of an occurrence. This regulation is transposed into our legal system through the Regulation (AAC) 10/2023.

### Accident

An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which:

- a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
  - being in the aircraft, or
  - direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or
  - direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew;
- b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
  - adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and
  - would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin;
- c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

### Serious incident

An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.

Note:

- The difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the result.

- Examples of serious incidents can be found in Attachment C of ICAO Annex 13 and in the ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ICAO Doc 9156).

## Incident

An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

Note: The type of incidents which are of main interest to the International Civil Aviation Organization for accident prevention studies are listed in the ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ICAO Doc 9156) and ICAO Annex 13.

### Major incident

An incident in which:

- Safety may have been compromised either having lead to a near collision between aircrafts, with the ground or obstacles (i.e. safety margins not respected which is not the result of an ATC instruction).
- Assessment of the incident using a risk classification process has identified that this incident could have deteriorated into more serious situation.

### Significant incident

An incident in which:

- An accident, serious or major incident could have occurred if the risk had not been managed within safety margins (one or more safety barriers remaining).
- Or if another aircraft or vehicle had been in the vicinity during the incident.

### **Occurrence without safety effect (Eurocontrol). A possibly safety related occurrence (not meeting the reporting requirements).**

Eurocontrol: An incident which has no safety significance.

Note: This appears to be a contradiction with the ICAO definition of an incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

A possibly safety related occurrence not meeting the reporting requirements. This could be e.g. the result of downgrading the incident after review.

## Observation

The observation of a potential safety issue or hazard that, if not rectified could cause or have caused an incident. The date and time of occurrence for an observation is that when it was first observed for the purposes of reporting and not an assessment of how long the safety issue might have been present.

## Not determined

The class of the occurrence has not been determined.

## Occurrence Categories

The CAA uses the ADREP occurrence category taxonomy to categorize occurrences (i.e. accidents and incidents) and analyse safety trends within these categories. The ADREP 2000 occurrence category taxonomy is a set of terms used by ICAO and it is part of the ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) System.

As listed below, each category has a unique name and identifier to permit common coding in accident/incident systems, and a text definition. Each category has also usage notes to clarify the category and aid in coding occurrences, but these notes are not presented here due to space constraints.

<b>ADRM</b>	Aerodrome (Occurrences involving aerodrome design, service, or functionality issues.)
<b>AMAN</b>	Abrupt manoeuvre (The intentional abrupt manoeuvring of the aircraft by the flight crew.)
<b>ARC</b>	Abnormal runway contact (Any landing or take-off involving abnormal runway or landing surface contact.)
<b>ATM</b>	ATM/CNS (Occurrences involving Air traffic management (ATM) or communications, navigation, or surveillance (CNS) service issues.)
<b>BIRD</b>	Birdstrike (Occurrences involving collisions/near collisions with birds.)
<b>CABIN</b>	Cabin safety events (Miscellaneous occurrences in the passenger cabin of transport category aircraft.)
<b>CFIT</b>	Controlled flight into or toward terrain (In-flight collision or near collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without indication of loss of control.)
<b>CTOL</b>	Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing (Collision with obstacle(s), during take-off or landing whilst airborne.)
<b>EVAC</b>	Evacuation (Occurrence where either; (a) person(s) are injured during an evacuation; (b) an unnecessary evacuation was performed; (c) evacuation equipment failed to perform as required; or (d) the evacuation contributed to the severity of the occurrence.)
<b>EXTL</b>	External load related occurrences (Occurrences during or as a result of external load or external cargo operations.)
<b>F-NI</b>	Fire/smoke (non-impact) (Fire or smoke in or on the aircraft, in flight or on the ground, which is not the result of impact.)
<b>F-POST</b>	Fire/smoke (post-impact) (Fire/Smoke resulting from impact.)
<b>FUEL</b>	Fuel related (One or more powerplants experienced reduced or no power output due to fuel exhaustion, fuel starvation/mismanagement, fuel contamination/wrong fuel, or carburettor and/or induction icing.)
<b>GCOL</b>	Ground Collision (Collision while taxiing to or from a runway in use.)
<b>GTOW</b>	Glider towing related events (Premature release, inadvertent release or non-release during towing, entangling with towing, cable, loss of control, or impact into towing aircraft / winch.)
<b>ICE</b>	Icing (Accumulation of snow, ice, freezing rain, or frost on aircraft surfaces that adversely affects aircraft control or performance.)
<b>LA<sup>1</sup></b>	Laser attack

<sup>1</sup> Laser attacks do not have a specific category as per the ICAO ADREP 2000 Taxonomy, they are included in the SEC (security related) category.

<b>LALT</b>	Low altitude operations (Collision or near collision with obstacles/objects/terrain while intentionally operating near the surface (excludes take-off or landing phases).)
<b>LOC-G</b>	Loss of control - ground (Loss of aircraft control while the aircraft is on the ground.)
<b>LOC-I</b>	Loss of control - inflight (Loss of aircraft control while or deviation from intended flightpath inflight.)
<b>LOLI</b>	Loss of lifting conditions en-route (Landing en-route due to loss of lifting conditions.)
<b>MAC</b>	Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) midair collisions (Airprox, ACAS alerts, loss of separation as well as near collisions or collisions between aircraft in flight.)
<b>MED</b>	Medical (Medical – occurrences involving illness of persons on board the aircraft.)
<b>NAV</b>	Navigation error (Occurrences involving the incorrect navigation of aircraft on the ground or in the air.)
<b>RAMP</b>	Ground Handling (Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations.)
<b>RE</b>	Runway excursion (A veer off or overrun off the runway surface.)
<b>RI</b>	Runway incursion - vehicle, aircraft or person (Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.)
<b>SCF-NP</b>	System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] (Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component - other than the powerplant.)
<b>SCF-PP</b>	Powerplant failure or malfunction (Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component - related to the powerplant.)
<b>SEC<sup>2</sup></b>	Security related (Criminal/Security acts which result in accidents or incidents (per International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] Annex 13).)
<b>TURB</b>	Turbulence encounter (In-flight turbulence encounter.)
<b>UIMC</b>	Unintended flight in IMC (Unintended flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).)
<b>USOS</b>	Undershoot/overshoot (A touchdown off the runway surface.)
<b>WILD</b>	Collision Wildlife (Collision with, risk of collision, or evasive action taken by an aircraft to avoid wildlife on a runway or on a helipad/helideck in use.)
<b>WSTRW</b>	Wind shear or thunderstorm. (Flight into wind shear or thunderstorm.)
<b>OTHR</b>	Other (Any occurrence not covered under another category.)
<b>UNK</b>	Unknown or undetermined (Insufficient information exists to categorize the occurrence.)


An important element of the occurrence category design is that it permits the association of multiple categories with an occurrence. Meaning, for example, if an engine failure occurred, and loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in both categories. Multiple coding supports the primary focus of the CAA - accident prevention - in which every pertinent element is investigated, recorded, and analysed.

<sup>2</sup> The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) has been designated to handle independently the collection, evaluation, processing, analysis and storage of details of the security related occurrences. However, the CAA remains responsible to handle independently the laser attack occurrences, which are included in the SEC category.

## Statistical Data Analysis

### Safety Performance & Trends

According to the data in the figures below, the 2025 reporting year set a new record for operational volume with **14,981 departures** (this figure includes scheduled, non-scheduled (charter) and ad-hoc commercial flight departures). While the total number of occurrences that the CAA has received has increased by **20.5%** (from 263 to 317), the Reporting Rate (occurrences per 1,000 departures) rose only slightly, indicating that the rise in safety reports is largely proportional to the traffic growth, with the notable exceptions of BIRD (Birdstrikes (Wildlife)) and RAMP (Ground Handling) categories.



**Figure 1.** Number of occurrences reported over the years: 2011- 2025

The number of **317 occurrences** reported in 2025 is higher by **142.3 occurrences** or **81.5%** than the average of 174.7 occurrences in the previous 14 years, 2011 - 2024. While the total number of occurrences reported to the CAA, from 2006 (when the occurrence reporting system was established in Kosovo) until the end of 2025, reached a total of **3027 occurrences**.


### 1. Reporting Culture & Traffic Normalisation

#### Reporting Rate Analysis

The “Reporting Rate” serves as a normalized metric to determine if the system is capturing more data per flight operation.

- 2025 Rate: **21.16 occurrences per 1,000 departures** (317/14,981).
- 2024 Rate: **19.45 occurrences per 1,000 departures** (263/13,518).
- Historical Context: While the rate has increased slightly from 2024, it remains significantly lower than the peak reporting year of 2023 (29.21 per 1,000). This suggests that while the volume

of reports is up, the frequency of events per flight has stabilized compared to two years ago.




**Figure 2.** Number of flight departures over the years: 2011 - 2025

### Seasonal Traffic vs. Occurrence Correlation

The correlation between traffic volume and occurrences was strongest in Q3:

- The “Summer Stress” Test: July and August represented the peak of operational complexity. July saw a massive spike to **59 occurrences**, driven by the convergence of high traffic volume, peak bird activity, and a localized cluster of Laser Attacks (9 in July).



**Figure 3.** Occurrences that occurred per month during the years: 2021-2025 and that were received by the CAA


- Winter Resilience: Despite winter operations usually bringing de-icing risks, January and December remained statistically average (18 and 19 occurrences), indicating effective winter ops management.

## 2. Category Performance: The Drivers of Risk

The 20.5% increase in total occurrences is not evenly distributed. It is driven almost entirely by two specific operational domains: **BIRD (Birdstrike/Wildlife Management)** and **Ground Operations (RAMP)**. For clarification, BIRD (Birdstrikes) and WILD (Collision with Wildlife - typically terrestrial animals) are distinct categories, and their statistical trends are completely different in 2025. While Birdstrikes (Avian Hazard) surged to a record high, the airport Wildlife (WILD - Animal Hazard) mitigation strategies have actually been quite effective, maintaining the lower figures achieved in 2024 (7) compared to the spike in 2023 (15).

### Birdstrikes (BIRD) - The Primary Statistical Driver

- Trend: The BIRD category is the single largest driver of the 2025 occurrence increase. Reports rose from **82** (in 2024) to **126** (in 2025), a **53.6% increase**.
- Rate Increase: The rate of birdstrikes rose to **84.1 per 10,000 departures**, up from 60.6 in 2024. This indicates that the risk of striking a bird increased disproportionately to the increase in flights.
- Seasonality: The risk profile is heavily weighted to late summer/autumn, with **August (29)** and **October (24)** accounting for 41% of the year’s total strikes.




**Figure 4.** Categorization of occurrences reported over the years 2023, 2024 and 2025

### Ground Handling (RAMP) - Enhanced Surveillance of Inbound Traffic

- The Metric: Occurrences in the RAMP category increased significantly from **23** (in 2024) to **56** (in 2025), a **143.5% increase**.

- **Operational Context:** A detailed review of the specific occurrences reveals that the majority of these reports (e.g., “Cargo nets not correctly closed”, “Static pillar net holders displaced” or “Loading height disregarded”) were identified during **arrival inspections**.
- **Analysis:** This surge does not reflect a decline in local handling quality. On the contrary, it indicates a **heightened level of vigilance** by local ground staff and inspectors. Ground teams at the Prishtina International Airport “Adem Jashari” (PIA), the only operational airport in Kosovo, are successfully identifying and reporting latent hazards that originated at foreign departure airports.
- **Strategic Implication:** The data suggests a **systemic quality control issue at upstream airports** rather than a local capacity issue. The high reporting rate proves that local turnaround inspections are serving as an effective “firewall” against unsafe outbound loading.



**Figure 5.** Comparison of top categories for the years 2023, 2024 and 2025

### ATM Systems - A Positive Trend


- **Decline:** Occurrences related to ATM/CNS dropped from 96 (in 2024) to **83 (in 2025)**.
- **Significance:** As traffic increased by nearly 1,500 departures, the decrease in ATM occurrences suggests improved stability in Air Traffic Services and Navigation infrastructure.

### 3. Severity & Classification Breakdown

#### Safety Pyramid Validation

The distribution of occurrence severity validates a healthy “Just Culture” where leading indicators (minor events) are reported frequently.

- **Occurrences without safety effect (OWSE):** 223 (70.4%).
- **Incidents:** 90 (28.4%).
- **Serious Incidents:** 3 (0.9%).
- **Not determined:** 1 (0.3%).



**Figure 6.** Classification of occurrences reported over the past years: 2021 - 2025

**The “Serious Incident” Shift**

While low in raw numbers, the increase of Serious Incidents from 2 in 2024 to 3 in 2025 warrants attention. These 3 events correspond to the high-risk categories identified from the occurrence reports (the TCAS RAs, Bird Strike / Engine Damage, and the Tire Burst / Alert Phase 2).

**Dual-Coding Impact**

- Methodology Note: Of the 317 total occurrences reported in 2025, seven (7) involved factors that required them to be dual-coded (appearing in two categories). Of these seven (7) occurrences, three (3) were double-coded in the ADRM and ATM categories, and four (4) were double-coded in the MAC and OTHR categories. This slight overlap (2.2%) does not statistically distort the major trends, but highlights the challenges in technical and operational interoperability between airport systems (ADRM) and ATM, and the complexity of events like the “MAC/OTHR” airspace infringements involving military traffic.

	Occurrence without safety effect	Incident	Significant incident	Major incident	Serious incident	Accident	Not determined	Total Cat.
ADRM	3 <sup>3</sup>	2	-	-	-	-	-	5
ATM	83 <sup>4</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	83
BIRD	88	37	-	-	1	-	-	126
F-NI	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
MAC	-	3 <sup>5</sup>	-	-	1 <sup>6</sup>	-	-	4
NAV	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
RAMP	51	5	-	-	-	-	-	56
SCF-NP	-	6	-	-	1	-	-	7
SCF-PP	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
SEC	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	16
WILD	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	7
OTHR	1	9 <sup>7</sup>	-	-	1 <sup>8</sup>	-	1	12
UNK	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Total	226 <sup>9</sup>	93 <sup>10</sup>	0	0	4 <sup>11</sup>	0	1	324 <sup>12</sup>

**Table 1.** Occurrences reported in 2025, their coded categories and determined classes

### Statistical Conclusion

In 2025, the Prishtina International Airport “Adem Jashari” and the Air Navigation Services Provider of the Republic of Kosovo (KANS) managed a **10.8% increase in traffic** (14,981 departures) while maintaining a robust reporting culture. The **Reporting Rate of 21.2 per 1,000 departures** indicates consistent safety monitoring. However, the statistical data clearly identifies a clear divergence in environmental risks: while **Ground Wildlife Control (WILD)** remains effective with occurrences stabilizing at 7 (down 53% from 2023 levels), **Bird Hazard Management (BIRD)** requires immediate focus, as birdstrikes reached a historic high of 126 events.

<sup>3</sup> All three (3) of these “Occurrences without safety effect” were double coded in the ADRM and ATM categories.

<sup>4</sup> Three (3) of these “Occurrences without safety effect” were double coded in the ADRM and ATM categories.

<sup>5</sup> All three (3) of these “Incidents” were double coded in the MAC and OTHR categories.

<sup>6</sup> This one (1) “Serious incident” was double coded in the MAC and OTHR categories.

<sup>7</sup> Three (3) of these “Incidents” were double coded in the MAC and OTHR categories.

<sup>8</sup> This one (1) “Serious incident” was double coded in the MAC and OTHR categories.

<sup>9</sup> The figure of 226 “Occurrences without safety effect” includes 3 dual-coded cases.

<sup>10</sup> The figure of 93 “Incidents” includes 3 dual-coded cases.

<sup>11</sup> The figure of 4 “Serious Incidents” includes 1 dual-coded case.

<sup>12</sup> The figure of 324 occurrences includes 7 dual-coded cases.

## Coded Occurrence Categories

This section provides detailed information on the coded categories of the occurrences reported in 2025. It lists the headlines of all the occurrences, along with their determined classes, and provides a brief description of the most significant occurrences reported in 2025.

**ADRM: Aerodrome** (Occurrences involving aerodrome design, service, or functionality issues. This category includes deficiencies/issues associated with runways, taxiways, ramp area, parking areas, buildings and structures, Crash/Fire/Rescue (CFR) services, obstacles on the Aerodrome property, power supply, lighting, markings, signage, procedures, policies, and standards. Occurrences of this category do not necessarily involve an aircraft.).

During 2025, five (5) occurrences were reported under the ADRM category. Two (2) of these occurrences involving FODs were classified as incidents, while three other occurrences, which were also categorized in the ATM category, were classified as occurrences without safety effect:

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
083 <sup>13</sup>	Incorrect Parking Stand	1	OWSE
168 <sup>14</sup>	Wrong Parking Stand Indication on Departure Strip	1	OWSE
189, 222	FOD Found on Runway/Taxiway	2	Incident
202 <sup>15</sup>	Miscommunication OCC/TWR Regarding Allocation of Parking Stands	1	OWSE

Two occurrences reported in this category were related to Foreign Object Debris (FOD) at Prishtina International Airport “Adem Jashari”. FOD refers to any object found in an inappropriate location at an aerodrome that has the potential to damage equipment or injure personnel. While these events underscored the importance of vigilance in preventing FOD-related hazards, none of them had any impact on flight safety. Prompt action by airport personnel ensured that aircraft, passengers, and staff always remained safe. In addition, one occurrence was related to miscommunication between the Operations Control Center (OCC) and the Tower (TWR) during the allocation of parking stands, while tow event concerned a perceived disturbance caused by an aerodrome vehicle positioned near the approach area. However, no incursion or operational breach was identified in this case.

**ATM: ATM/CNS** (Occurrences involving Air traffic management (ATM) or communications, navigation, or surveillance (CNS) service issues.).

The table below and Figure 7 shows that during 2025, occurrences concerning ATM systems and procedures (including Aeronautical Information and Meteorological Services) accounted 26% of all occurrences reported during the year. This percentage does not indicate that safety was compromised, as backup systems are in place for these services. Rather, it reflects the positive reporting culture demonstrated by ANSP personnel.

Occurrences covering ATM technical failures or defects, mainly related to communication, navigation, surveillance, meteorological equipment, aeronautical information systems, etc. are

<sup>13</sup> This occurrence was categorized as ADRM and ATM.

<sup>14</sup> This occurrence was categorized as ADRM and ATM.

<sup>15</sup> This occurrence was categorized as ADRM and ATM.

coded under this category, as well as any other occurrence pertaining to or involving ATM procedures and systems. ATM related occurrences are classified according to the effect they have on safety and categorized based on the service/system they affect.

As listed below, 83 occurrences reported during 2025 were coded in the ATM category:

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
074	AFTN Problems	1	OWSE
003, 007, 018, 034, 041, 052, 076, 084, 120, 136, 137, 179, 190, 220, 267, 272, 287, 300, 301, 307, 310	Problems with MET Forecasting Systems	21	OWSE
296, 311	Problems with Surveillance Systems	2	OWSE
064, 101, 139, 221, 230, 308	Problems with Radio Communications	6	OWSE
	Working condition	0	-
002, 004, 006, 009, 069, 077, 078, 082, 125, 178, 186, 199, 205, 212	Problems with Automatic Weather Observing System and its Sensors	14	OWSE
057	Internet failure	1	OWSE
	Problems with Direct Phone Lines	0	-
107, 290	Navigation system	2	OWSE
013, 058, 083 <sup>16</sup> , 087, 100, 102, 127, 129, 134, 151, 168 <sup>17</sup> , 185, 202 <sup>18</sup> , 209, 235, 237, 239, 280	Aeronautical Information	18	OWSE
075, 085, 086, 117, 234, 236, 281, 286, 299, 302	Radar Data Processing	10	OWSE
	ATIS Problems	0	OWSE
132, 133, 156, 157	Problems with Surveillance Systems - Gjakova	4	OWSE
	Runway Incursion	0	OWSE
	TCAS RA	0	-
	ATC Procedure	0	-
	Power outage	0	-

<sup>16</sup> This occurrence was categorized as ADRM and ATM.

<sup>17</sup> This occurrence was categorized as ADRM and ATM.

<sup>18</sup> This occurrence was categorized as ADRM and ATM.


042, 068, 098	Radar Data Recording	3	OWSE
070	Other	1	OWSE

From the table above and the Figure 7, occurrences involving meteorological equipment, aeronautical information systems and surveillance systems were the most prominent during 2025, accounting for 42%, 22% and 15%, of the overall ATM occurrences, respectively.

Of the 42% of occurrences related to meteorological systems, 25% were associated with forecasting system issues, while 17% were linked to the Automatic Weather Observing System (AWOS) and its sensors.

Of the 22% of occurrences related to aeronautical information systems, 4% were associated with system failures of CRONOS, while 18% involved human errors related to data entry by staff.


Out of the total 15% of occurrences related to the surveillance systems, 3 % were related to the resets of Controller Working Position (CWP) or radar data loss, while 12% were related to radar data processing problems.



**Figure 7.** A breakdown of the ATM occurrences into sub-categories


With regard to their impact on safety, all of the ATM related occurrences have been classified occurrences without safety effect (OWSE).

Furthermore, the Figure 8 shows graphically sub-categories of the ATM related occurrences according to their severity classification.



**Figure 8.** ATM occurrences according to their severity classification

Whereas, Figure 9 below shows the breakdown of the ATM related occurrences, reported during the past two years, into specific sub-categories and the number of occurrences within these sub categories.



**Figure 9.** A comparison of the ATM occurrences reported during 2024 and 2025

If we compare the categories between 2024 and 2025, it is observed that some of them have shown an increase, while others have experienced a slight decrease. A decrease was noted in meteorological systems (from 41 to 35) and other communication systems (from 17 to 2). However, an increase was noted in aeronautical information services, from 4 occurrences in 2024 to 18 in 2025.

A summary of the ATM related occurrences according to their sub-categories is provided below.

### **Radio and other communication systems:**

There were 8 reported occurrences related to radio communication systems, and all of them were classified as occurrences without safety effect (OWSE). Of these, 6 involved radio communication issues related to noise and interference in frequency, while another 2 were related to problems with the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) and internet. The reduction in the total number of occurrences was influenced by the decrease in AFTN-related issues, which are categorized under other communication systems.

No occurrences were reported regarding Direct Phone Line communications, ATIS, or the VCSS system.

### **Meteorological systems:**

There were 35 reported occurrences related to meteorological observation and forecasting systems, all of which were classified as occurrences without safety effect (OWSE).

Of the total occurrences, 14 were related to the Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) and 21 to the MET forecasting systems. It is worth noting that back-up systems are in place for the provision of meteorological services and products, ensuring the continued transmission of meteorological information.

During 2025, ANSA prepared an investigation report addressing the issues related to AWOS. In addition, a separate investigation was conducted regarding the accuracy of the RVR values, which form part of the AWOS system.

### **Surveillance (radar) systems:**

There were 16 reported occurrences related to surveillance systems, including Gjakova Radar.

Of these, 2 involved restart of the Controller Working Position (CWP) or radar data loss, while 10 were related to radar targets and processing.

It is worth noting that although there was an increase in occurrences in 2025, KANS implemented the ATM system in the TWR unit, which has significantly contributed to reducing occurrences related to CWP.

Additionally, 4 occurrences were related to the surveillance system installed in Gjakova. All of OR were classified as occurrences without safety effect (OWSE).

### **Navigation Systems (NAVAID)**

There were 2 occurrences categorized in the NAVAID sub-category, related to the functioning of the Instrument Landing System (ILS).

The navigation system at Pristina International Airport has been upgraded from ILS CAT II, in ILS CAT IIIB, enabling aircraft to land in very poor visibility conditions assisted by meteorological system (AWOS). All of OR were classified as occurrences without safety effect (OWSE).

**Aeronautical Information Systems**

There were 18 reported occurrences related to aeronautical information system. Out of the total, 3 occurrences were associated with malfunctions of the CRONOS system (Centralized Repository for Online NOTAM Operations System). It is important to note that all AIS products were disseminated through alternative means, ensuring uninterrupted service provision. During 2025 KANS has prepared an investigation report regarding the CRONOS-related issues.

The remaining 15 occurrences were associated with human errors resulting from manual data entry by staff and are related to adding incorrect parking stand or flight plan or wrong information provided in KRZ. KANS has also prepared an investigation report regarding the issue of wrong coordinates in KRZ.

All of OR were classified as occurrences without safety effect (OWSE).

**Other occurrences:**

Other reported occurrences were categorized in other sub-categories including one OR related to the diversion of the flight due to medical emergency. The necessary coordination was conducted among the involved parties.

This category also includes three additional occurrences related to the Data Recording and Processing System (DRPS), representing 4% of the occurrences.

KANS has prepared an investigation report addressing the issues related to radar data recordings. The report analyses the circumstances of the occurrence, identifies contributing factors, and provides recommendations aimed at preventing similar issues in the future.

It should also be noted that the system is outdated and further investment is not feasible, as a new ATM system is being implemented that will replace old one

All of OR were classified as occurrences without safety effect (OWSE).

**BIRD: Birdstrike** (Occurrences involving collisions/near collisions with birds. Unconfirmed birdstrikes are also included in this category.).

As listed below, 126 birdstrikes and suspected birdstrikes were reported during 2025, of which 88 were classified as occurrences without safety effect, 37 as incidents and one as a serious incident. Starting from 2019 and onwards, every confirmed birdstrike is classified as an incident, except when the results of the investigation suggest otherwise.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
011, 016, 030, 038, 044, 045, 051, 067, 080, 111, 121, 128, 138, 148, 149, 150,	Bird Strike, Suspected	88	OWSE

153, 162, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 181, 182, 183, 187, 188, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 204, 207, 208, 210, 211, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 231, 233, 238, 240, 242, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 257, 259, 260, 262, 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 278, 283, 284, 285, 289, 304, 306, 309, 313, 316			
001, 012, 014, 015, 026, 031, 032, 033, 037, 049, 050, 072, 073, 089, 094, 095, 096, 097, 110, 114, 123, 124, 130, 131, 135, 154, 155, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 256, 263, 315	Bird Strike	37	Incident
201	Bird Strike, Aircraft Returned to Land Due to Engine Damage	1	Serious Incident

Note: In two instances, the same occurrence was reported and recorded twice.

Figure 10 below shows the trend of the reported birdstrikes per each month during 2025.




Figure 10. Birdstrikes reported during 2025 compared to the previous four years

Based on the best practice standards produced by the International Bird Strike Committee (IBSC) and those adopted by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), a confirmed or unconfirmed birdstrike occurrence has been standardised as follows:

- **Confirmed birdstrike:** Any reported collision between a bird and an aircraft for which evidence, in the form of a carcass, or other remains, is found on the ground; or damage and/or other evidence is found on the aircraft. Bird remains or complete carcass found on an aerodrome where there is no other obvious cause of death should be treated as a confirmed strike and reported as such accordingly.
- **Unconfirmed birdstrike:** Any reported collision between a bird/wildlife and an aircraft for which no physical evidence is found (i.e. no damage to the aircraft is evident upon inspection, and no bird remains, carcass or blood smears are evident on the airframe).

Of the total number of birdstrike occurrences reported in 2025, 38 were confirmed birdstrikes. These included cases where tangible evidence was present, as well as instances where only blood marks were found on the aircraft without bird remains or carcasses being recovered from the PIA runway.

The most frequently involved species in 2025 was the FALCON - KESTREL. Falcons are medium-sized, ground-feeding birds, typically found in open grasslands, cultivated fields and areas with soft, moist soil, which support their feeding behaviour. Their primary attractants around aerodromes include short grass, insects exposed after rainfall and open terrain with minimal disturbance. Seasonal flocking behaviour, particularly during migration and wintering periods, further increases the likelihood of their presence in the vicinity of aerodromes, making them a recurring hazard requiring continuous monitoring and management.

During the period January-December 2025, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) received a total of 126 bird strike related occurrence reports. Compared to the corresponding period of the previous year, the number of reported bird strike occurrences in 2025 demonstrates a significant increase. This upward trend indicates a potential escalation in wildlife hazard exposure at the aerodrome and may require further assessment and mitigation measures.

According to the aerodrome operator, in certain cases pilots report a bird strike even when no actual collision has occurred, for example when a bird is observed near the aircraft. Although such reports do not involve physical contact, they remain valuable as they provide important indications of bird activity in the vicinity of the aerodrome and highlight areas that require attention from the operator.

**F-NI: Fire/smoke (non-impact)** (Fire or smoke in or on the aircraft, in flight or on the ground, which is not the result of impact.).

The two occurrences listed below reported during 2025, which were classified as incidents, were coded in the F-NI category.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
008	Aborted Take-Off Due to Thick Vapour and Strong Smell in the Cockpit	1	Incident
088	Smoke in Cabin	1	Incident

The incident **Aborted Take-Off Due to Thick Vapour and Strong Smell in the Cockpit** (File No. 008) occurred during the take-off roll, the flight crew performed a high-speed Rejected Take-Off (RTO) after passing 80 knots but prior to V1. The decision to abort was triggered by the sudden onset of a strong chemical odour and the rapid accumulation of thick vapour in the cockpit.

The Pilot in Command (PIC) identified the vapour as likely ingested de-icing/anti-icing fluid, a known risk following ground de-icing procedures. Although the crew initially anticipated minor fumes, the vapour density increased to a level that impaired instrument visibility. To rule out a more severe technical failure (e.g., fire or toxic smoke), the PIC elected to abort the take-off in accordance with standard safety protocols.

The aircraft came to a controlled stop before Taxiway Echo. The crew confirmed brake cooling requirements and issued a “Normal Operation” call to the cabin to prevent an unnecessary emergency evacuation.

While the technical issue was resolved and the pilot initially intended to proceed with the flight, passenger anxiety regarding the incident led to a request for disembarkation. The aircraft subsequently returned to the gate to allow passengers to exit. No medical or fire assistance was required.

The incident **Smoke in Cabin** (File No. 088) occurred during a thunderstorm while an A321 aircraft was parked on a stand of the Kilo Apron of Prishtina International Airport “Adem Jashari” with boarding in progress. The purser initially reported smoke in the cabin to the flight crew, who declared a MAYDAY: Smoke in the Cabin to Tower (TWR), considering the need to expedite assistance in case of potential danger. TWR acknowledged the Mayday declaration, immediately notified the Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) via the crash phone, and requested additional information from the pilot-in-command (PIC). The PIC suspected a possible lightning strike could have triggered the smoke. However, both the smoke and odour completely dissipated shortly thereafter, prompting the PIC to cancel the Mayday.

A thorough technical inspection of the aircraft was conducted, no adverse findings were recorded and the aircraft was released to service, which allowed the crew to resume their flight operations with a two-hour delay.

As part of the investigation, the CAA requested and reviewed CCTV footage from the airport operator (LKIA). The footage didn’t show any evidence of a lightning strike. The CAA also reviewed the flight crew’s safety report and copies of the technical records of the technical examination carried out at both Prishtina (PRN) and Istanbul Sabiha Gökçen (SAW) airports, finding that these documents adequately addressed this safety issue.

## **Conclusion**

Both occurrences demonstrate a high level of safety culture and professional decision-making by flight crews when faced with cockpit or cabin air quality anomalies. In both incidents, the crews prioritized the “worst-case scenario” (potential fire or toxic smoke) over operational expediency.

While subsequent investigations - including technical inspections at PRN and SAW, and the review of airport CCTV - confirmed that no permanent airframe damage or fire occurred, the actions taken were appropriate according to standard operating procedures (SOPs). The effective use of emergency communication channels (Crash Phone/RFFS mobilization) ensured that airport emergency services were positioned to intervene immediately had the situations escalated.

**LA: Laser attack.** See: **SEC: Security related.**

**MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) midair collisions** (Airprox, ACAS alerts, loss of separation as well as near collisions or collisions between aircraft in flight.).

The four occurrences listed below reported during 2025 were coded in the MAC category and also in the OTHR category. The first of these was classified as a serious incident, and the other three as incidents.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
081 <sup>19</sup>	TCAS with Unknown Traffic	1	Serious Incident
113 <sup>20</sup>	Traffic Advisory (TA) Intruder Reported by Two Air Operators	1	Incident
118 <sup>21</sup>	TCAS Traffic Advisory (Including Three Flights)	1	Incident
161 <sup>22</sup>	TCAS TA with Unidentified Traffic Followed by RA	1	Incident

The above Near Mid-Air Collision (MAC) occurrences, all of which involved unidentified traffic, suspected to be military aircraft, were also coded under the OTHR category to highlight the involvement of non-communicating traffic within controlled airspace.

**1. High-Severity Resolution Advisories (RA)**

Critical safety events occurred where commercial aircraft were forced to manoeuvre due to the presence of non-responsive military traffic.

- High-Altitude Descent Conflict (File No. 081): During descent through 13,500 ft, a B737 encountered two unidentified aircraft crossing 1,200 ft below. The flight crew responded to a Resolution Advisory (RA) by climbing. No traffic was known to ATC, and military coordination failed to respond to inquiries.
- ILS Approach Interference (File No. 161): While on approach to RWY35, a A320 aircraft encountered a target at 4,700 ft within the Prishtina CTA. The intruder, suspected to be a traffic which was previously denied training clearance, crossed the extended centreline. This resulted in a TCAS RA, forcing the flight to execute a missed approach.

**2. Traffic Advisories (TA) involving “Intruder” Aircraft**

Multiple flight crews reported TAs with targets that were frequently non-visible to radar or lacked altitude reporting (Mode C).

- Non-Visible/No-Mode C Targets (File No. 118, which includes three CAT flights that encountered MAC events and occurred on the same day): Two flights reported TAs near waypoint PR720 and the “Camp Bondsteel” area. In both cases, targets appeared on cockpit TCAS displays but were absent from ATC radar screens or lacked Mode C data.
- STAR/Arrival Route Infringements:
  - Two flights (File No. 113) reported intruders and TAs while on Standard Arrival Routes (STARs) between 8,000 ft and 11,000 ft. A target squawking 4227 was later identified in the vicinity at a low altitude.

<sup>19</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.  
<sup>20</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.  
<sup>21</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.  
<sup>22</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.

- One flight (File No. 118, the third CAT flight) encountered an unidentified aircraft crossing the ILS path 14 NM from the airport. KFOR later confirmed traffic indications in the “Camp Bondsteel” area.

**Key Safety Observations**

- **Unauthorized CTA Operations:** Unidentified military traffic is consistently operating within Prishtina CTA 1 and 3 without maintaining radio contact or obtaining clearance.
- **Training Disregard:** In one instance, a specific military aircraft appears to have operated in the ILS area despite being explicitly instructed to stay away due to high commercial traffic volume.
- **Coordination Limitations:** The inability to reach military liaisons (KFOR) during active TCAS RA events presents a significant barrier to immediate conflict resolution and airspace safety.

**NAV: Navigation error** (Occurrences involving the incorrect navigation of aircraft on the ground or in the air.).

As listed below, three of the occurrences reported in 2025 were categorized as NAV. All three of these occurrences were classified as incidents.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
090	Aborted Take-Off	1	Incident
169	Right Turn Without Authorization	1	Incident
305	Missed Approach due to Higher Speed during Approach Phase	1	Incident

The above NAV occurrences, involving an Aborted Take-Off, an Unauthorized Orbit on Final and a Missed Approach, required immediate ATC intervention to maintain separation from conflicting traffic.

**1. Aborted Take-Off - Departure Roll Interruption** (File No. 090)

A departure resulted in an aborted take-off shortly after the aircraft began its roll on Runway 35. The aircraft (A321) stopped on the runway unexpectedly. Due to incoming traffic on short final, ATC directed the crew to vacate the runway via Taxiway R2 to clear the landing strip. The aircraft vacated the runway and returned to Apron Kilo.

The flight crew did not provide a specific technical or operational reason for the aborted take-off to the ATC at the time of the occurrence.

**2. Unauthorized Orbit on Final** (File No. 169)

Upon switching to the Tower frequency for landing, the flight crew of a A319 initiated an unauthorized right-hand 360-degree turn while established on the final approach. The pilot informed the Tower controller of the manoeuvre mid-turn, stating it was necessary to lose excessive altitude.

Recognizing the deviation and potential conflict with arrival sequencing, the Tower controller immediately instructed the aircraft to perform a Missed Approach. The pilot declared they were unable to comply with the Missed Approach instruction, citing adverse weather conditions on the final approach path.

To ensure the safety of other sequenced traffic, the Tower controller coordinated with the Approach unit. It was determined that the aircraft should remain on the Tower frequency to complete the orbit and stabilize the landing.

The aircraft completed the unauthorized turn, regained the correct glide path, and landed. While no loss of separation was reported, the incident highlights a breakdown in standard arrival procedures and the rejection of a mandatory ATC safety instruction (Go-Around).

### 3. Missed Approach - Approach Speed Management (File No. 305)

During the arrival phase for Runway 35, the flight crew of a B737 executed a Missed Approach. The pilot reported that the aircraft was maintaining a speed too high to safely stabilize the approach. At the time of the go-around, another aircraft was currently on its take-off roll.

ATC successfully ensured separation between the arriving and departing traffic in full compliance with MATS.

**RAMP: Ground Handling** (Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations, which include collisions that occur while servicing, boarding, loading, and deplaning the aircraft also during boarding and disembarking while helicopter is hovering, injuries to people from propeller/main rotor/tail rotor/fan blade strikes, push-back/power-back/towing events, jet blast and prop/rotor down wash, aircraft external preflight configuration errors that lead to subsequent events, and all parking areas (ramp, gate, tiedowns).).

As listed below, 56 of the occurrences reported in 2025 involved ground handling services and were coded into the RAMP category. 51 of them were classified as occurrences without safety effect, and the other 5 as incidents. Out of the 56 reported RAMP occurrences, 28 were analysed by flight safety inspectors, and the same number by aerodrome inspectors.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
010, 019, 021, 024, 047, 048, 091, 092, 105, 115, 116, 122, 180, 192, 213, 232, 252, 264, 275, 282	Nets in Cargo Compartment Not Correctly Closed / Open	20	OWSE
025, 028, 029, 039, 054, 059, 106, 176, 277, 291	Static Pillar Net Holder Displaced / Not in Place / and Damaged	10	OWSE
027	ULD not Loaded Correctly and Contaminated with Ice	1	OWSE
035, 062, 063	Open Panel/Headset Panel on Arrival	3	OWSE
040	Dent in the Fuselage	1	OWSE
043	Handle of Compartment Door Not Properly Closed	1	OWSE
053	Mail Loaded into Wrong Aircraft	1	OWSE
056, 258	Scratch/Black Stain on the Front Door/Back Door of Aircraft	2	OWSE
060	Pilot didn't Follow Marshalls Instructions	1	OWSE
093	Loading Not as Per Load-Sheet	1	Incident

119	Scratch on Rear Passenger Door	1	OWSE
152	Damage on Compartment Hold	1	OWSE
243	Damaged Net Clip in Compartment	1	OWSE
245	Dent on the Right Side of Passenger Door	1	OWSE
254	Fuel Panel Not Secured	1	OWSE
274	Damage on Front Passenger Door Holder	1	OWSE
276	Damage on Compartment Door Frame	1	OWSE
279	Missing Part on Cabin Passenger Door Handle	1	OWSE
288	Aircraft Floor in Compartment 3 Damaged	1	OWSE
292	Missing Fuel Cap	1	OWSE
295, 303	Compartment Loading Height Limit Not Respected	2	Incident
297	Damage Noticed on the Aircraft Radome	1	Incident
298	Aircraft Toilet Service Panel Found Open	1	Incident
317	Damaged Compartment Ceiling Near Baggage Net Clip	1	OWSE

The above reported RAMP occurrences, involving several operators and aircraft types (B737, A319, A320, A321, E195), can be categorized into three primary areas: **Cargo & Loading Integrity**, **Airframe & Component Integrity**, and **External Panels/Fuelling**. All occurrences listed were identified during arrival or pre-flight inspections at PRN - Prishtina International Airport “Adem Jashari” (PIA), and have been formally forwarded to the respective airlines for further investigation.

### 1. Cargo Compartment & Loading Irregularities

The most frequent category of occurrence involves failures in securing cargo and adhering to loading limitations.

- **Restraint System Failures:** Multiple instances of cargo nets being left open or incorrectly closed upon arrival. Specific hardware issues included missing or damaged net clips and static pillar net holders being displaced or out of position.
- **Loading Violations:** Recurring instances where loading height limits were exceeded, with baggage found loaded above the safety line, potentially interfering with smoke detection or fire suppression systems.
- **Structural Damage:** Damage was noted to compartment ceilings, side wood panels, and floor sections (notably on aircraft of one airline).

### 2. Airframe and Exterior Damage

Visual inspections identified several surface and structural discrepancies:

- **Fuselage & Doors:** Reports include a dent near a front passenger door, scratches on rear passenger doors, and damage to a compartment door frame.
- **Component Wear:** Cracks were identified on an aircraft radome; the pilot was notified and acknowledged the condition.
- **Hardware Issues:** A missing part on a cabin passenger door handle and a curved/damaged handle were reported on one’s airline flights, the latter resulting in a 35-minute maintenance delay.

### 3. External Panels and Fuelling

Three specific instances of unsecured or missing external components were recorded:

- Toilet Service (TS) Panel: An aircraft arrived with the TS panel in the open position.
- Fuel System: One aircraft arrived with a missing fuel cap; after consultation with maintenance, it was cleared for departure. Additionally, a fuel panel lock was found improperly secured on another flight.

In all cases, the Pilot in Command (PIC) or relevant airline personnel were notified immediately. As these findings pertain to aircraft maintenance and cabin/hold integrity prior to arrival or within the airline’s direct responsibility, all reports - supported by photographic evidence - have been forwarded to the respective airlines for technical evaluation and corrective action.

**SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]** (Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component - other than the powerplant.).

As listed below, seven occurrences reported during 2025 were coded under System Component Failure – Non-Powerplant (SCF-NP). Six of them were classified as incidents and one as a serious incident.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
005	Departed Aircraft Returned to Land Due to Technical Problems	1	Incident
020	Gear Retraction Failure	1	Incident
022	Loss of Navigational Aids	1	Incident
071	Transponder Not Working	1	Incident
141	Alert 1 Activated Due to Problems with Flaps	1	Incident
215	Alert 2 Activated Due to Suspected Tire Burst	1	Serious Incident
226	Alert 1 Activated Due to a Technical Problem	1	Incident

The above seven incidents involve mechanical, hydraulic, or electronic system malfunctions that required aircraft to divert, return to land, or execute emergency procedures.

#### 1. Pressurization and Flight Control Malfunctions

- Pressurization Failure (File No. 005): Shortly after departure, the B737 aircraft stopped its climb at FL160 due to pressurization issues. After initially transferring to Tirana, the crew elected to return to Prishtina. The landing was completed safely without a request for assistance.
- Flap Asymmetry/Jam (File No. 226): Following departure, the crew reported “stuck flaps” preventing the aircraft from reaching climb speeds. Alert Phase 1 was activated. The B737 aircraft entered a holding pattern to manage the configuration before returning for a safe landing.
- Flap Malfunction & Alert Phase 1 (File No. 141): During the initial approach, the flight crew executed a Missed Approach. The crew subsequently informed Prishtina Approach of technical issues related to the aircraft’s flaps. The pilot notified ATC that the second approach would be conducted at a higher-than-normal airspeed due to the flap configuration. The crew requested the RFFS (Fire Brigade) to be on standby and asked for a ground inspection of the brake pads post-landing, anticipating high brake temperatures from the increased landing speed. The pilot opted not to declare an emergency (Mayday) or urgency (Pan-Pan), but ATC appropriately

initiated a proactive safety response. Alert Phase 1 was activated. The aircraft landed safely without further incident. Alert Phase 1 was formally deactivated after the aircraft cleared the runway and operations returned to normal.

## 2. Landing Gear and Tire Integrity

- Gear Retraction Failure (File No. 020): After departing Prishtina, the crew reported a gear indication malfunction and an inability to retract the landing gear. The aircraft returned to the PR720 holding pattern to verify the “down and locked” status before landing safely. RFFS was placed on standby as a precaution.
- Suspected Tire Burst (File No. 215) Serious Incident: Inbound traffic from Stuttgart (EDDS) reported a suspected burst tire. A comprehensive response was initiated:
  - Visual Inspections: The aircraft performed two low passes for visual verification by Tower and ground technicians.
  - Fuel Burn: The aircraft held for 30 minutes to reduce landing weight.
  - Emergency Response: Alert Phase 2 was activated. Post-landing inspection confirmed the right rear outer gear was damaged, despite initial visual reports from the air suggesting normal conditions.

## 3. Critical Loss of Navigational Aids and Transponders

- Total Navigational Failure (File No. 022): After an initial transponder issue on the ground was “resolved” the aircraft departed. Shortly after take-off, the transponder failed again (No Mode C), followed by a total failure of all navigational aids. The PIC declared ‘PAN-PAN’, and ATC provided emergency vectors for a right base approach. Alert Phase 1 was activated, and the aircraft landed safely.
- Transponder Visibility Issues (File No. 071): A vaccination flight was ordered to return to land after it became invisible on radar. Despite multiple attempts to recycle the transponder, radar contact could not be established. Per regulatory requirements for operating in controlled airspace, the flight was terminated.

## Conclusion

The seven reported incidents highlight a significant reliance on Air Traffic Control (ATC) intervention and Airport Emergency Services (RFFS) to mitigate risks stemming from mechanical and electronic failures. A critical commonality is that these failures often occurred or re-emerged immediately after departure, suggesting that “intermittent” issues - particularly regarding transponders and flight controls - frequently escalate into high-workload emergencies (e.g. ‘PAN-PAN’ declarations or high-speed landings).

The successful resolution of these cases, especially the Total Navigational Failure (File No. 022) and the Tire Burst (File No. 215), underscores the effectiveness of current emergency phase protocols (Alert 1 and 2). However, they also demonstrate the limitations of visual ground inspections, which failed to accurately diagnose the gear damage in File No. 215 before the aircraft touched down.

**SCF-PP: Powerplant failure or malfunction** (Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component - related to the powerplant.).

As listed below, one occurrence reported during 2025 was coded under the SCF-PP category and was classified as an incident.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
023	Fire on Engine No. 1	1	Incident

The above System Component Failure - Powerplant (SCF-PP) incident involved a tailpipe fire during engine start of a Boeing 737. The event was managed through strict adherence to non-normal checklists and coordinated ground support.

### 1. Event Description

During the engine start sequence following pushback, the flight crew attempted a cross-bleed start for Engine #1 after noting insufficient pneumatic pressure from the APU. Upon positioning the start lever to idle (fuel flow), the headset operator reported visible flames coming from the back of the engine. Notably, no fire warning was triggered in the cockpit, confirming the event as an internal tailpipe fire rather than an external nacelle fire.

### 2. Flight Crew and Emergency Response

- **Immediate Action:** The crew aborted the start sequence and executed the “Engine Tailpipe Fire” non-normal checklist. The engine was motored for over 60 seconds to blow out the flames and cool the turbine.
- **Ground Coordination:** RFFS (Fire Brigade) was notified via OCC and arrived on-site rapidly. The crew maintained communication with cabin staff and ground personnel to ensure passenger safety and real-time situational awareness.
- **Resolution:** Once the fire was confirmed extinguished and no smoke was visible, the aircraft taxied back to stand on Apron K under its own power (Engine #2) for passenger disembarkation.

### 3. Technical Analysis and Corrective Actions

- **Root Cause:** The analysis suggests the fire was likely a result of the attempted cross-bleed start following a previous aborted start, a rare but known phenomenon where excess fuel in the tailpipe ignites during the subsequent start cycle.
- **Maintenance Intervention:** The aircraft was repositioned to Apron D for controlled engine testing. Technicians performed a precautionary maintenance measure on the engine ignition.
- **Outcome:** Following successful motoring and start-up tests supervised by maintenance and RFFS, the aircraft was cleared for service and departed about two and a half hours after the initial engine start.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The incident was effectively mitigated by the crew’s adherence to Boeing’s non-normal procedures and the rapid response of the ground teams.

- **Recommendation:** A review of APU bleed air supply systems is suggested to address the initial pressure insufficiency.
- **Training:** Reinforcement of communication protocols between ground crews and the cockpit regarding “flames vs. smoke” is recommended to streamline the decision-making process for secondary start attempts.


**SEC: Security related** (including **LA: Laser attack** sub-category) (Criminal/Security acts which result in accidents or incidents (per International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] Annex 13). Examples include: a) hijacking and/or aircraft theft; b) interference with a crewmember (e.g., unruly

passengers); c) flight control interference; d) ramp/runway/taxiway security; e) sabotage; f) suicide; and g) acts of war.)

As listed below, during 2025 there were 16 occurrences related to laser attacks (pointing a laser at an aircraft in flight) reported to the CAA, and all were classified as incidents.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
066, 079, 099, 103, 104, 109, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 158, 184, 203, 206, 314	Laser Attack	16	Incident

These incidents involved laser attacks on 14 civilian and 2 military aircraft, most of which occurred during the critical phases of the aircraft’s flight - final arrival and landing, while they were within a short distance of PIA “Adem Jashari”.



**Figure 11.** Laser attacks reported during 2021 - 2025

Figure 11 above presents a comparison of the reported laser attacks by month over the past five years: 2021 - 2025.

As stated in the Statistical Data Analysis section of the Overview and as can be seen in the figure above, after a big decline in 2020, influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, with only 2 occurrences, the SEC category (which contains the Laser attack sub-category) has been gradually increasing since 2021, when it had 8 occurrences, to a new high of 16 occurrences recorded in the last two years, 2024 and 2025. A relatively high number of laser attacks can be a worrying sign as they can lead to pilot incapacitation and have serious consequences for the safety of aircraft operations.



**Image 1.** Illustration of the visual effects of a laser pointed in a cockpit (Courtesy of: FAA)

Lasers are not illegal, what you do with them can be. Shining lasers at aircraft in flight is a serious risk to the safety of passengers and crew, as well as people living close to airports. Laser strikes constitute a criminal offence and are carried out deliberately by violators who can be fined and can also face criminal charges. The CAA strongly urges anyone who observes such activity at night, especially in the vicinity of an airport, to contact the police immediately.

The CAA remains the body responsible for the independent handling of the collection, evaluation, processing, analysis and storage of details of the laser attack occurrences, although the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo is designated to handle independently the security (SEC) related occurrences, which includes the laser attack occurrences.

**WILD: Collision Wildlife** (Collision with risk of collision, or evasive action taken by an aircraft to avoid wildlife on a runway or on a helipad/helideck in use.).

This category encompasses encounters with wildlife on any movement area of the aerodrome, including runways, and also accounts for instances where evasive action taken by the flight crew leads to consequences such as gear collapse or collisions off the movement area. Notably, WILD excludes bird strikes, which are separately coded as Bird (BIRD).

As listed below, seven occurrences reported to the CAA that occurred at PIA during 2025 were coded into the WILD category and were all classified as incidents.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
017	Dog Crossing Runway	1	Incident
036	Rabbits next to RWY	1	Incident
108	Wildlife Strike	1	Incident
112	Dog on the RWY	1	Incident

174	Dog crossing runway	1	Incident
294	Dogs close to the RWY	1	Incident
312	Rabbit Hit on the RWY	1	Incident

The presence of wildlife on the aerodrome and its vicinity poses a serious threat to safe flight operations. In order to manage the wildlife and to minimize the likelihood of collisions between wildlife and aircraft, LKIA has developed a Wildlife Risk Management Program (WRMP), which has been reviewed and approved by the CAA.

To enhance the effectiveness of wildlife management, particularly in response to reported occurrences involving dogs, the aerodrome operator has increased the frequency of on-site inspections, with a focus on identified weak points along the security perimeter fence. In addition, as a last resort to reduce the presence of rabbits within the aerodrome perimeter, the operator has engaged outsourced hunting services.

**OTHR: Other** (Any occurrence not covered under another category.).

As listed below, 12 occurrences reported in 2025 were coded into the OTHR category, including 4 occurrences (081, 113, 118 and 161) that were also coded in the MAC category. One of these occurrences was classified as ‘not determined’, one as an occurrence without safety effect, 9 of them as incidents, and one as a serious incident.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
046	Operation Not in the Flight Schedule	1	Not determined
055, 261	Airspace Infringement	2	Incident
061	Drone Operation Request	1	Incident
065	Approval for Quarry Demolition Activity	1	OWSE
081 <sup>23</sup>	TCAS with Unknown Traffic	1	Serious Incident
113 <sup>24</sup>	Traffic Advisory (TA) Intruder Reported by Two Air Operators	1	Incident
118 <sup>25</sup>	TCAS Traffic Advisory (TA)	1	Incident
126	Unknown Traffic Reported by Pilot	1	Incident
161 <sup>26</sup>	TCAS TA with Unidentified Traffic Followed by RA	1	Incident
241	Unauthorised Paragliding Activity	1	Incident
293	Engine Cover Damage	1	Incident

Below are summarised eight occurrences that were coded only in the Other (OTHR) category, ranging from procedural coordination failures and unauthorized airspace activities to technical observation. Whereas, the other four occurrences (081, 113, 118 and 161) coded in the MAC category and also the OTHR category, are summarised above in the MAC section of the overview, while the main reason for coding them also in OTHR was to highlight the involvement of non-communicating traffic within controlled airspace.

<sup>23</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.

<sup>24</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.

<sup>25</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.

<sup>26</sup> This occurrence was categorized as MAC and OTHR.

## 1. Procedural & Coordination Irregularities

- **Unscheduled Flight Operations (File No. 046):** A flight plan was activated for an aerial work aircraft not listed in the Prishtina International Airport slot management schedule. Despite lack of initial information from the OCC, the flight was eventually authorized via email after departure, highlighting issues with flight approval by Slot Management and a significant communication gap between them and AIS.
- **Drone Authorization Conflict (File No. 061):** A dispute arose when KFOR demanded an approval licence for a drone deemed unregistered by the CAA. KFOR attempted to assign liability for potential problems to AIS and the CAA. AIS clarified its role as an intermediary, stating it holds no responsibility for the operator's documentation.
- **Quarry Demolition Verification (File No. 065):** ATC requested verification for blasting activity at a Skenderaj quarry. Although not initially reflected in the Kosovo Restricted Zone (KRZ), the activity was permitted to proceed after AIS performed an emergency verification of KFOR's prior approval via email.

## 2. Airspace Infringements & Unidentified Traffic

- Two significant breaches of controlled airspace involving unidentified or non-coordinating aircraft:
  - **Kosovo Airspace Infringement (File No. 055):** An aircraft (Squawk 3613) at 6,000 ft entered Kosovo airspace without prior permission or notification. Coordination efforts were obstructed when Belgrade ACC declined to provide flight details despite the infringement. No response was received from military liaison (KFOR) at the time of the event.
  - **CTA Airspace Breach (File No. 261):** An unidentified aircraft (Squawk 4233) entered CTA3 at 6,500 ft without radio contact, crossed the extended centreline south of the airport, and descended below 3,500 ft toward Bondsteel. KFOR was notified of the infringement.
- **Unidentified TCAS Target (File No. 126):** While on the ARBER1D departure, the crew reported a target on their display with no altitude readout 4NM prior to PR724. No corresponding traffic was visible on ATC radar
- **Unauthorized Paragliding (File No. 241):** A VFR helicopter reported unauthorized paragliding activity 6NM northeast of the airfield. AIS confirmed that no permissions had been granted for the location, posing a hazard to low-level flight operations.

## 3. Maintenance Observations

- **Engine Cover Damage (File No. 293):** During a visual arrival check for an A320 aircraft, damage was identified on the engine covers. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acknowledged prior awareness of the condition. The report has been forwarded to the airline for further technical evaluation.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

These occurrences highlight recurring challenges in civil-military coordination and unauthorized airspace usage.

- **AIS/Slot Management:** A formal review of the "Unscheduled Flight" protocol is recommended to ensure AIS is not placed in an "unenviable position" regarding flight acceptance.
- **Airspace Safety:** Increased monitoring of paragliding and drone activities is necessary to mitigate risks to VFR and IFR traffic within the CTA.

**UNK: Unknown or undetermined** (Insufficient information exists to categorize the occurrence.).

As listed below, two occurrences reported in 2025 were coded into the UNK category. Both of these occurrences were classified as incidents.

File Number(s)	Headline of Occurrence	Number of Occurrences	Occurrence Class
140, 146	Drone Activities in Apron Area	2	Incident

Both of the above occurrences involve reported drone activity in the immediate vicinity of the second largest aircraft parking apron.

**1. Drone Sighting - Delta Apron** (File No. 140):

In the early evening, technical personnel of an airline reported a drone operating directly over the Delta Apron to OCC. The ATC Tower was subsequently alerted, but was unable to visually confirm the presence of the UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) at that specific moment. However, they later observed a possible drone in the vicinity of a car racing area near the airport and they made a renewed request for police intervention to secure the area.

**2. Coordinated Drone Movement & External Activity** (File No. 146):

The second report was received regarding drone movements on the Delta Apron. Upon notification from Duty Ops, ATC confirmed they had no radar or visual contact but advised a police inspection on the apron. Shortly after the initial report, ATC identified related activity near the airport perimeter (specifically the car racing track). This information was relayed to the airport police to assist in locating the drone operators.

The recurrence of drone sightings over the Delta Apron poses a significant security and safety risk to ground operations and aircraft taxiing. The inability of ATC to visually confirm these small targets from the tower highlights the difficulty in detecting consumer-grade drones using traditional surveillance. However, the rapid communication chain between airline technical personnel, OCC, ATC, and Police ensured that law enforcement was mobilized quickly to investigate the perimeter.



March 2026

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